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TAXATION-KIMBELL-DIAMOND STILL AVAILABLE AS AN ADJUNCT TO
SECTION 334(b) (2).
Between September, 1954 and November, 1955, a period exceeding twelve
months, taxpayer, American Potash and Chemical Cooporation (Potash) ac-
quired 100 percent of the outstanding stock of Western Electro Chemical Com-
pany (Wecco) in exchange for shares of the taxpayer's voting stock plus cash
in lieu of fractional shares. The purpose of the acquisition was to obtain Wecco's
assets.1 Potash operated Wecco until June 30, 1956 at which time Wecco was
completely liquidated and all its assets distributed to Potash. Taxpayer com-
puted its depreciation deduction for the depreciable assets received from Wecco
on a "cost" basis.2 The Internal Revenue Service contended that the correct basis
of these assets was the basis of the assets in the hands of Wecco prior to the
liquidation. The Service argued that the assets received in the liquidation were
subject to a "carryover" basis under section 3323 and section 334(b) (1) 4 of the
1. "For the purpose of this motion, both plaintiff and defendant agree that the stock
acquisition of Wecco and its liquidation were undertaken for the purpose of obtaining the
the Wecco assets, i.e., plaintiff purchased the stock to reach the assets .... ." American Potash
and Chemical Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 198 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
2. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1012 reads in part:
SEC. 1012. BASIS OF PROPERTY-COST
The basis of property shall be the cost of such property, except as otherwise
provided....
Cost is the amount paid for such property, (a) "... in cash .... ", Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-
1(a); (b) in other property, the valuation of such property to be determined by its fair
market value at the time it is surrendered, Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States,
126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954); (c) in the amount of debts assumed by the purchaser,
United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938), reh. den. 304 U.S. 588 (1938); and, (d) in
shares of stock valued at the fair market value at the time of issuance, Pierce Oil Corp., 32
B.T.A. 403 (1935).
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 332 reads in part:
SEC. 332. COMPLETE LIQUIDATIONS OF SUBSIDIARIES
(a) General Rule.-No gain or loss shall be recognized on the receipt by a
corporation of property distributed in complete liquidation of another corporation.
4. Id. § 334 reads in part:
SEC. 334. BASIS OF PROPERTY RECEIVED IN LIQUIDATIONS
(a) General Rule.-If property is received in a distribution in partial or com-
plete liquidation .. . and if gain or loss is recognized on receipt of such property,
then the basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be the fair mar-
ket value of such property at the time of the distribution.
(b) Liquidation of Subsidiary.-
(1) In general.-If property is received by a corporation in a distribution
in complete liquidation of another corporation . . . then, except as provided in
paragraph (2), the basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be
the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor....
(2) Exception.-If property is received by a corporation in a distribution in
complete liquidation of another corporation ... , and if-
(A) the distribution is pursuant to a plan of liquidation adopted-
(i) on or after June 22, 1954, and
(ii) not more than 2 years after the date of the transaction described in
subparagraph (B) .. .and
(B) stock of the distributing corporation possessing at least 80 percent of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, and at
least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock ...
was acquired by the distributee by purchase . . . during a 12-month pe-
riod ....
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Internal Revenue Code as assets received by a parent in the process of liquidat-
ing its wholly owned subsidiary.5 Potash, on the other hand, proposed that the
liquidation was excepted from the application of sections 332 and 334(b) (1)
by the doctrine enunciated in Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner.(
This doctrine, according to the taxpayer, remains viable, not being pre-empted
by the enactment of section 334(b) (2),J the legislative exception to the general
rule of section 334(b) (1).8 Held, that a corporation which purchases all of the
stock of another corporation and subsequently liquidates the subsidiary, upon
a showing of the requisite intent, may still use a cost basis for the assets received
upon liquidation although the stock purchase fails to comply with the specific
requirements of section 334(b) (2). American Potash and Chemical Corp. v.
United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,9 a corporation intending to
acquire the assets of another corporation was faced with a unique tax problem
when such assets had appreciated in value and the shareholders of the latter
corporation were willing to sell the stock but not the assets. Where an outright
purchases of assets was made, section 113(a) [currently section 1012] 10 re-
quired the application of a "cost" basis for the determination of the depreciation
then the basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be the adjusted
basis of the stock with respect to which the distribution was made.
5. The Service advanced two arguments to support its position that a carryover basis
was required. The Commissioner's first contention was that the acquisition of Wecco and
the subsequent liquidation was a reorganization under section 368 (a) (1) (C) of the Code.
Thus, being a section 368(a) (1) reorganization, a carryover basis was mandated under section
362(b) of the Code which provides in part:
(b) Transfers to Corporations.-If property was acquired by a corporation in
connection with a reorganization to which this part applies, then the basis shall
be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor, increased in the amount
of gain recognized to the transferor on such transfer.
The court found that a reorganization had not occurred and thus concluded that the carry-
over provision of section 362(b) was not applicable.
The Commissioner's alternative argument was that involving section 334. This note will
restrict itself to a discussion of this second contention.
6. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam,
187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951). In this case the taxpayer,
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. was engaged in the business of milling, processing and selling
grain products. In 1942, the taxpayer sustained a fire casualty which completely destroyed
one of its physical plants. Finding it impractical to construct a new structure, the taxpayer
acquired all the stock of another corporation which owned a milling plant substantially
comparable to the taxpayer's destroyed property. The taxpayer paid $210,000 for the stock
of the new corporation. The taxpayer's adjusted basis in the assets destroyed was $18,922.
-The insurance proceeds amounted to $118,200. Under the non-recognition provision of sec-
tion 112(f) [currently section 1033(a)], the taxpayer's cost basis in the newly acquired
company was therefore $110,772 ($18,922 basis in the property destroyed plus $91,800 addi-
tional cash paid). The basis of the assets in the hands of the subsidiary was $139,522. A few
days subsequent to the acquisition, the taxpayer liquidated the acquired company and caused
the subsidiary's assets to be distributed to the parent. The Tax Court sustained the Com-
missioner's proposition that because the transaction was substantially a purchase of assets,
a cost basis of $100,722 had to be used, notwithstanding the carryover requirements of sec-
tion 113(a)(15) of the 1939 Code, see inira note 11.
7. See supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. H. R. REP. No. 2762, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
10. See supra note 2.
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deductions. But if the corporation acquired the assets indirectly by purchasing
the stock of the selling corporation and immediately thereafter liquidating it,
section 113(a)(15) [currently section 334(b)(1)]11 would have mandated the
application of a "carryover" basis. The practical result of this was that a corpo-
ration interested in acquiring assets but unable to do so because of the reluc-
tance of the selling corporation, was precluded from using a "cost" basis for the
acquired assets notwithstanding that the price paid by the parent was based on
the fair market value of the assets at the time of the stock acquisition. Thus,
the literal application of the carryover provisions created a dichotomy between
two acquisitions which were identical in substance, differing only in form.
This dichotomy, however, also ran in favor of the taxpayer. Thus where a
corporation wished to acquire the assets of another corporation in whose hands
the assets had a basis in excess of their fair market value, the acquiring corpo-
ration, by taking the stock purchase route, was able to get a stepped-up basis.' 2
Indeed, this is similar to what occurred in the Kimbell-Diamond case where
the taxpayer acquired the stock of another corporation at a "cost"' 3 which was
less than the basis of the assets in the hands of the acquired company. Applying
the strict statutory interpretation of section 113 (a) (15) [currently section
334(b) (1)], the parent assumed a carryover basis and computed its deprecia-
tion deductions on this higher amount.' 4
In an effort to minimize the apparent inconsistency in the treatment of such
transactions, the courts developed an exception to the strict application of sec-
tion 113 (a) (15) 15 [currently section 334 (b) (1) ]. Where it was determined that
the parent had purchased the stock of the subsidiary for the purpose of acquir-
ing its assets, and promptly after the acquisition the parent liquidated the sub-
sidiary,16 it was generally held that a "purchase" of assets had occurred.17 This
11. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 113 (a) (15) provided in part:
(15) Property Received by a Corporation on Complete Liquidation of Another. If
the property was received by a corporation upon a distribution in complete liquida-
tion of another corporation within the meaning of section 112(b) (6), then the basis
shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor....
12. For example, see Kanawha Gas & Utilities Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685
(5th Cir. 1954); Texas Bank and Trust Co. of Dallas, 12 T.C.M. 588 (1953).
It has generally been held that if the entire transaction was in fact essentially the pur-
chase of assets, the different steps will not be separately treated, at the instance of either
the government or the taxpayer, regardless of whether the result imposes a tax or relieves
from taxes. Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 99 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1938);
Tulsa Tribune v. Commissioner, 58 F.2d 937, 940 (10th Cir. 1932). Although these cases
were decided prior to Kimbell-Diamond, a Memorandum Decision, Texas Bank & Trust Co.
of Dallas, supra, relying fully on Kimbell-Diamond, allowed a corporate taxpayer the higher
cost basis, rejecting the Commissioner's contention that a carryover basis was required. See
also, Mansfield, The Kimbell-Diamond Situation; Basis to the Purchaser in Connection With
Liquidation, 13 N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 623, 624 (1953).
13. See supra note 6.
14. Id.
15. See supra note 11.
16. It is not clear how soon after the acquisition the acquired corporation would have
to be liquidated in order to qualify under the Kimbell-Diamond rationale. In Kanawha Gas
& Utilities Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954), an intervening period of six
months did not preclude the application of a cost basis. But in Trianon Hotel Co. v. Com.
121
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
conclusion was based on the assumption that the two steps-the acquisition of
stock and the subsequent liquidation of the subsidiary-were in fact a single
transaction, namely, the purchase of assets. Since the transaction was merely a
"purchase" of assets, a section 112(b)(6)18 liquidation [currently section
332(a)] had not occurred and consequently the carryover provisions of sec-
tion 113(a) (15) [currently section 334 (b) (1) ] were not applicable. Thus being
a purchase, a cost basis under section 113(a) [currently section 1012] had to
be applied. From the leading case in this field, this principle became known as
the Kimbell-Diamond rule.
Although the development of the Kimbell-Diamond rationale was premised
on the notion of promoting equity in the tax consequences of certain economic
transactions, the operation of that judicial concept was not satisfactory. Founded
upon subjective intent, it failed to provide certainty and therefore led to a
most difficult variety of litigation, that involving proof of the party's intent at
the time of a stock acquisition. Each case had to be determined on the basis of
its own factual situation with the result that a taxpayer was not able to predict
with reasonable certainty the consequences of his activity. 19
The revision of the 1939 Code and the resulting 1954 Code sought to put
the taxpayer on notice that particular tax consequences will result from certain
types of transactions. 20 Further, it was intended that where different taxpayers
pursue different avenues to accomplish the same result, each taxpayer would
thereby incur similar tax consequences. 21 Realizing that exclusive reliance on
this judicial doctrine was inconsistent with the basic objectives of the 1954 Code,
Congress set down certain quantitative guidelines in the enactment of section
334(b) (2).
missioner, 30 T.C. 156 (1958), a period of one year denied the taxpayer the use of a cost
basis upon the liquidation of a subsidiary.
17. See Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aJJ'd per
curiam 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951); Commissioner v.
Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938), where the court pointed out at page
591 ". . . taxation is an intensely practical matter, and . . . the substance of the thing done
and not the form it took must govern." See also Carter Publications, Inc. v. Commissioner,
28 B.T.A. 160 (1933).
18. INT. RV. COD of 1939, § 112(b) (6) provided in part:(6) Property Received by a Corporation on Complete Liquidation of Another.-No
gain or loss shall be recognized upon the receipt by a corporation of property
distributed in complete liquidation of another corporation ....
19. Even where the corporate purchaser liquidated the subsidiary promptly after the
stock acquisition, the Kinmbell-Diamond rule was held inapplicable where the intent to dis-
solve was not present at the time of the stock purchase. Distributors Finance Corp. v.
Commissioner., 20 T.C. 768, 784, acq. 1954-2 CuM. BuLL. 4.
20. I. R. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., (1954).
21. Your committee has revised existing law in conformity with its objective of
making it sufficiently definite to permit taxpayers to ascertain in advance the tax
consequences of their actions. Your committee's bill is designed to insure that the
same tax consequences result from the different types of transactions which are
available to accomplish substantially the same result. This correlation is important
not only because it promotes clarity and certainty in the law but also because it
insures that taxpayers cannot, by choosing the type of transaction, in effect choose
the type of tax for which they are liable.
Id. at 39.
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Section 334(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, incorporating
the law as it existed in section 113(a)(15) of the 1939 Code, sets forth the
general rule that whenever a parent corporation completely liquidates its sub-
sidiary in a nontaxable liquidation, a carryover basis shall be used.22 The ex-
ception to this general rule is embodied in section 334(b) (2).23 Under this sec-
tion, where the conditions of section 334(b) (1) are met, and:
(i) the plan of liquidation was adopted within two years after the parent
acquired 80 percent of the subsidiary's stock, and
(ii) the parent acquired its 80 percent stock interest within a period of 12
months, and
(iii) it acquired such interest by a taxable purchase or exchange and not
from a related party,
then the parent corporation shall have a basis in the property received on the
liquidation determined by reference to its cost in the subsidiary's stock. Unlike
the judicially formulated Kimbell-Diamond doctrine,24 section 334(b) (2)25 is
applicable without regard to the acquiring corporation's intent or purpose at the
time of the stock acquisition. The formal steps will be controlling.26
The question of whether section 334(b) (2) is the sole mechanism for ob-
taining a "cost" basis, to the exclusion of the Kimbell-Diamond principle, has
heretofore been unresolved. The tax commentators have been divided on this
issue. Some authorities felt that "the more reasonable interpretation would
seem to be that, at least where a corporate buyer is involved, the statutory rule
is meant to be a complete substitute for the Kimbell-Diamond rule, and the
stock basis will not carry over to the parent unless the specific rules of section
334(b) (2) are satisfied." 27 Indeed, the commentators continue, "any other con-
struction would reestablish the same imprecision which the statute was designed
to negate. ' 28 However, other noted authorities have expressed the contrary view
that:
* . . an automatic application of §334(b) (2) whenever the statutory
conditions are satisfied . . . does not necessarily mean that Kimbell-
Diamond has no continuing vitality when these statutory conditions
are not satisfied. Thus, a deliberate avoidance of the time limits for
acquiring the stock or liquidating the acquired corporation might, on
a finding of an intent to acquire assets, produce the same result as
under pre-1954 law .... 29
22. See supra note 11.
23. See supra note 4.
24. See supra note 6.
25. See supra note 4.
26. REv. RuL. 60-262, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 114.
27. Schwart, Acquisition of Stock of Another Corporation In Order to Acquire Assets,
1957 S. CAL. TAx INsT. 45, 65-66.
28. Freling, What Is New In Subchapter C: The Service's Current Ruling Policy, 23rd
INsr. on FED. TAx. 421, 438 (1965).
29. BITTxER AND EusTIcE, FEDERAL INcoimE TAXATiON or CoRPORAToINs AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 378 (2d ed. 1966).
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Certain authorities, on the other hand, have remained neutral on the subject
of the vitality of Kimbell-Diamond admitting that a court determination was
required.30
The court in the instant case observed that the legislative history of section
334(b) (2) in no instance expressly provided that the newly enacted statute was
to be the exclusive exception to the carryover rule of section 334(b) (1). Nor
did Congress state that the doctrine enunciated in Kimbell-Diamond was still
viable. The original House Report on the 1954 Code,81 the court continued, ex-
tended the application of section 334(b) (2) to any shareholder, corporate or
individual.32 The Senate report, however, limited the application of this section
to corporate taxpayers and stated that:
Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) incorporates into your committee's
bill rules effectuating principles derived from Kimbell-Diamond Milling
Co., supra. (Emphasis supplied.)33
The court recognized that the legislative history of the section reflected a
Congressional intent to inject some degree of certainty into an area of tax law
previously occupied by problems of proving that a taxpayer had the requisite
intent. However, it is not a necessary conclusion therefrom that Congress in-
tended, by establishing an objective route for obtaining a cost basis without the
need for proving an intent to acquire assets, to prohibit both the government
and the taxpayer from further resort to proof of a subjective intent to obtain
the assets in situations where the objective tests of section 334(b) (2) had not
been fulfilled. Further, the court stated that there is no indication that a tax-
payer, by virtue of the precise rule of section 334(b) (2), is to be afforded an
opportunity to choose between a carryover and a cost basis. If the statute is the
only route for avoiding a carryover basis, a taxpayer can elect, with relative
ease, either to comply with the statute or not to comply. There is no indication
that the basis of the assets acquired in these transactions is to be an elective
matter. Indeed the court continued, it would seem preferable from the govern-
ment's point of view, to retain the basic step-transaction approach to achieve
substance over form in a situation where a taxpayer, possessed of the requisite
subjective intent, deliberately avoids the statute. Thus, where a corporate tax-
30. "Whether the courts . . . will ... apply the intent test of Kimbell-Diamond and
restrict the basis of the assets to the cost of the stock even though the specific requirements of
section 334(b) (2) are not satisfied, has not yet been answered." CUIELSTEI AND SURREY,
WORLD TAX SERIES-TAXATION iN THE UNTED STATES 757-58 (1963). See also Cohen,
Gelberg, Surrey, Tarleau and Warren, Corporate Liquidations Under the Internal Revnue
Code of 1954, 55 CoLuLX. L. Rav. 37, 43-44 (1955).
It is somewhat disquieting to contemplate the coexistence of a precise statu-
tory rule based on objective criteria and a more nebulous judicial rule based on
subjective intent. Yet such a possibility cannot be ruled out summarily. The courts
may be puzzled by a statute which purports to prescribe a definite rule without
the right of election, yet states the rule in such a way that an election is actually
permitted ....
31. See supra note 20.
32. See supra note 20 at 38.
33. S. REP'. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 257 (1954).
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payer has demonstrated that its intention upon the acquisition of the subsidi-
ary's stock was to acquire assets, the court determined that the taxpayer will be
allowed to apply a cost basis, notwithstanding its failure to comply with section
334(b) (2).
It may well be argued that the holding in the instant case substantially
undermines the congressional intent of injecting "some degree of certainty" in
this area of tax law. The taxpayer who seeks to have a "cost" basis on the
assets received upon liquidation, now has two alternative routes by which he
can attain his expectancy. One is to comply with section 334(b) (2). This
avenue will assure the taxpayer a "cost" basis. The alternative route is to
qualify under the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine. The availability of this method
will depend on the taxpayer's ability to demonstrate the requisite intent.
The taxpayer seeking a "carryover" basis, however, is not assured that such
a "carryover" will be available. Under the holding in the instant case, such a
taxpayer, although falling outside the provisions of section 334(b) (2), must be
prepared to challenge a possible contention by the Commissioner that an in-
tent to acquire assets existed. Since the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to
rebut the Commissioner's allegation, the tax law, at least for this taxpayer, thus
reverts back to the pre-1954 era of litigating a taxpayer's subjective intent.
Furthermore, it may be argued that the holding in the instant case can only
lead to an extension of the applicability of the Kimbell-Diamond rationale. The
Commissioner may indeed advance the following contention. The court in the
instant case held that compliance with section 334(b) (2) is not mandatory to
allow a "cost" basis where an intent to acquire assets is demonstrated. How-
ever, to limit such a showing for the purpose of establishing a "cost" basis is
illogical. Thus, although a taxpayer has fulfilled the requirements of section
334(b) (2), the Commissioner should not be denied the opportunity to demon-
strate that the intent at the time of the acquisition was not to acquire assets.
Such an extension, the argument would continue, would reinstate the same im-
precision inflicting the tax law prior to the enactment of section 334(b) (2).
These arguments, however, are untenable. Congress, in enacting section
334(b) (2), intended to inject some degree of certainty into this area of the tax
law and not absolute certainty. Such absolute certainty would be available if
section 334(b) (2) was construed to pre-empt Kimbell-Diamond. However,
where absolute certainty is read into a section, an invitation to manipulate is
created. It is axiomatic in the area of income taxation that the substance of the
transaction prevails over its form. Thus to say that section 334(b) (2) is the
exclusive vehicle for obtaining a cost basis would be to ignore the substance
of the transaction and to give validity to its form. It is most doubtful that such
was the congressional intent.
Further, the argument that the court's holding in the instant case creates
greater uncertainty for a taxpayer seeking a carryover basis is not a valid re-
jection of the court's decision. Section 334(b) (2) was intended to offer relief
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to a taxpayer seeking a cost basis. Indeed, the congressional history does not
speak of a carryover basis taxpayer but confines its consideration to the tax-
payer seeking a cost basis. Thus the conclusion that greater uncertainty is
created for the taxpayers seeking a carryover basis is irrelevant in an analysis
of the 6ourt's holding.
The final argument suggests that the Commissioner may offer evidence of a
taxpayer's intention not to acquire assets and thus deny a cost basis notwith-
standing compliance with section 334(b) (2). Unquestionably, this would rein-
state the conditions existing prior to the enactment of the section. However, to
support this contention would be to conclude that Congress, in enacting section
334(b) (2), intended that the section be construed out of existence. This is a
most illogical presumption.
It would thus appear that the arguments supporting the pre-emption of
Kimbell-Diamond are unfounded for two main reasons. First, as a matter of
judicial construction, the legislative history fails to express an intent to pre-
empt case law, and, second, as a practical matter, full pre-emption could only
lead to full manipulation. It is doubtful that Congress enacted section 334(b) (2)
for the purpose of facilitating the manipulation of the Internal Revenue Code.
Although it is clear that henceforth the rationale of the Kimbell-Diamond
case will be available as an adjunct to section 334(b) (2), the court does not
indicate the exact nature of the factual evidence required to establish the requi-
site intent. Furthermore, assuming that the requisite intent is established, the
court fails to decide whether such intent could be negated by subsequent conduct
of the corporation such as the operation of the subsidiary for several months
after the initial acquisition. There are no clear guidelines provided as to whether
subjective intent to acquire assets will of itself suffice to justify the exclusion
from the requirements of section 334(b) (2).
HARRY SUSHEK
